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Abstract: The paper presents an organizing framework for 
directly incorporating United States Department of Defense 
(DoD) joint operational concepts into early-stage engineering 
management and system design. It translates operational level 
guidance from DoD Joint Publications to a concise Operational 
Mission Architecture Framework (OMAF) that can be used as 
a starting point for engineering management efforts. The 
OMAF is used to orient the development of systems architec-
ture products per Department of Defense Architecture Frame-
work (DoDAF) standards. Resultantly, the OMAF serves as 
a bridging mechanism between the language and terminology 
employed in the joint operational community and the engineer-
ing management community.
Keywords: Systems Architecture, Mission Engineering, Archi-
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T he United States Department of Defense (DoD) deploys forces, from each of its constituent services, to conduct operations around the world across multiple warfighting 
domains. Joint operations need to be flexible and react to an 
ever-changing environment and mission. As a result, support 
for these operations is necessarily episodic, meaning that orga-
nizations assemble, operate, and disassemble based on mission 
requirements. This is an extremely difficult and complex under-
taking and often results in the joint force often encountering 
capability shortfalls due to the wide variety in operational usage 
of specifically engineered systems.
While the joint operations conducted by the DoD are episo-
dic and inherently unpredictable, the development, acquisition, 
and management of the systems that support those operations are 
considerably more regimented and defined. Since 2002, the DoD 
utilizes the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Sys-
tems (JCIDS) to define capabilities for the DoD enterprise (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2015b). The DoD relies on the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) to deliver systems that address materiel solutions to 
capability gaps identified via the JCIDS (Department of Defense, 
2003). While there are defined relationships between these two 
systems, there is limited interaction between these linked pro-
cesses and the joint operations they are intended to support. 
Specifically, while DAS delivers materiel solutions for capability 
gaps identified via the JCIDS, the systems are not designed to 
provide traceability to the operational capability that is ultimately 
delivered by those systems. Thus, it is not possible to ensure that 
any system developed in compliance with the JCIDS/DAS pro-
cesses will meet the needs of the end user, specifically, the joint 
operational force.
The purpose of this paper is to present a mapping frame-
work that supports communication between the engineering 
management community and the DoD operational commu-
nity. It surveys over 80 existing DoD joint doctrine publica-
tions and identifies a common set of operational elements and 
associated purposes that can be used as the starting point for 
system engineering and management efforts. The framework 
presented in this paper translates those operational elements 
and purposes to standardized architectural representations 
used in the engineering management community. That trans-
lation allows engineering managers to engage with the DoD 
joint operational community by framing engineering manage-
ment products as specific responses to joint operational issues. 
The paper assesses joint lessons learned from four historical 
operations to demonstrate the applicability of the approach for 
engineering managers.
Motivation and Background
Disconnect between the end user and the various commu-
nities (management, engineering, development, design) that 
support the end user is an issue that has persisted in both 
the engineering and engineering management communities 
and is not unique to the DoD. Sharon et al. (2011) summarize 
this issue in detail, noting that while engineering management 
has well-established and detailed project management tools 
and techniques to facilitate communication across domains, 
the disparate experiences and perspectives of the relevant 
individuals make it nearly impossible to arrive at 
a consistent understanding of the problem. Recent work in 
engineering management has endeavored to develop those 
tools and techniques. A succinct summary of product devel-
opment frameworks and an assessment of their linkage 
between operational/knowledge-based input and more con-
crete tools and techniques are presented in Martinez Leon 
and Farris (2011). Cilli et al. (2015) provide additional detail 
regarding the impact to the DAS, acknowledging that while 
operational perspective is intended to inform the engineering 
management of both system budget and capabilities there is 
no direct linkage between those processes. Enterprise level 
assessments of the utility of these process to support engineer-
ing management as well have been proposed from both U.S. 
(Giachetti, 2015; Amissah & Handley, 2016) and non-U.S. 
(Van Aken et al., 2003) perspectives to support improved 
military decision-making.
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While that research has established engineering manage-
ment approaches for integration of military engineering and 
acquisition processes, there is a gap in the literature that speci-
fically addresses the unique challenge associated with the war-
fighter’s role as both the end user of the systems of interest and 
the developer of doctrine guiding operation of the system of 
interest. In recent years, notable efforts have been made to 
highlight the potential utility of engineering management 
tools and techniques to aid in bridging this gap. Tompkins 
et al. (2020) utilize a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) to provide 
a bridge for system maturity assessment that can span the 
system lifecycle; Brooks et al. (2011) provide strategies for the 
application of engineering management strategies to manage 
tensions between the operational and engineering communities; 
Gonzalez-Lopez and Bustos (2019) provide an approach for the 
integration of enterprise and business process architectures; Di 
Schiena et al. (2013) describe the characteristics of learning 
organizations exhibited by military units that make them can-
didates for application of engineering management strategies; 
and Yip et al. (2019) examine strategies for deconflicting 
between stakeholder priorities in early-stage system design.
While existing work has contributed to cross-domain com-
munication, both within the DoD and in the larger engineering 
management community, there is no existing approach that 
addresses the disconnect between system focused DoD engi-
neering and management processes and the operationally 
focused DoD joint operation process, specifically the varied 
terminology that is used in each community. This paper 
addresses that challenge, thereby expanding the existing litera-
ture by providing engineering managers an orienting frame-
work that deconflicts terminology used in the operational and 
engineering management communities within the DoD. To 
support that expansion, this paper has two primary objectives. 
First, it presents an organizing construct and associative map-
ping tool called the Operational Mission Architecture Frame-
work (OMAF) to organize key elements of operational 
capability into an architecture form and support integration 
of episodic joint operational capability with the JCIDS and 
DAS. Second, it presents an implementation of the OMAF 
using Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) products to demonstrate the support for conversa-
tions between the operational community and the engineering 
management community and enable a top-down engineering 
management effort tailored to joint operational capability and 
System of Systems (SoS) development.
Engineering Management Considerations for U.S. DoD 
Operations
The DoD recognizes three levels of warfare: Strategic, Opera-
tional, and Tactical. While there are no firm boundaries between 
warfare levels, they provide perspective for operations arrange-
ment, resource allocation, and task assignment. Notably, DoD 
Joint Publication (JP) 3: Joint Operations, serves as the keystone 
authoritative document (along with JP 3–01 through 3–72) to 
describe the fundamental constructs for joint operations.
While Joint Operations generally span the three levels of 
warfare (Strategic, Operational, and Tactical), the operational 
level is where strategy is implemented and tactical actions are 
aggregated to yield desired outcomes. Thus, this paper focuses 
on the operational level. Our motivation is to provide an 
integrating bridge between operations and system acquisition.
At the operational level, the concept of Unified Action is 
the fundamental objective, encompassing the synchronization, 
coordination, and integration between all participating govern-
mental and nongovernmental organizations. Achieving Unified 
Action leads to Unity of Effort, which mitigates the risk of loss 
of life and operational instability. Expanding these guiding 
concepts, the authors develop Exhibit 1 to frame Joint Opera-
tions in terms of 10 principle Operational Elements. Note that 
these Operational Elements as well as their associated Purposes 
are developed by identifying commonalities from across the 83 
existing DoD Joint Publications. Assessment and development 
of joint operational concepts in terms of these elements are 
conducted and sustained via the Joint Force Development Life 
Cycle.
The Joint Force Development Life Cycle
Joint force development is accomplished through a systematic 
effort that integrates capabilities developed by contributing 
services and prepares individuals and teams to execute assigned 
missions (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). Exhibit 2 presents an 
overview of the Joint Force Development Life Cycle.
While the process supports both improvement and sustain-
ment of joint warfighting capability, the process is a closed 
loop. The closed structure of the process results in a reliance 
on the knowledge of the participants, rather than allowing for 
the integration of inputs from existing requirements-based 
processes, such as JCIDS and DAS. Further complicating the 
issue, the continuous nature of the joint force development 
lifecycle is a prerequisite for the DoD to provide episodic, 
event-driven operational capability that can be met by indivi-
dual services. This process is generally supported by three 
subordinate processes: Joint Concepts, Joint Doctrine, and 
Joint Lessons Learned.
The purpose of Joint Concepts, as described in (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013), is to provide the Joint Force with 
a vision for conducting operations. Joint Concepts introduce 
enterprise-level efforts that dictate governance, business pro-
cesses, technical standards and lexicon, interoperability goals, 
architecture standards, and system designs that shape the Joint 
Force. Joint Doctrine elaborates those efforts by establishing 
fundamental principles and authoritative guidance for the 
employment of Joint Forces (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017). That 
guidance is comprehensive and evolves through doctrinal pub-
lications that integrate Joint Concepts with inputs from the 
Joint Force, often informed by feedback and lessons learned 
from Joint Operations and Joint Exercises (Rowlett, 2013). 
Those Joint Lessons Learned inform progression of both Joint 
Concepts and Joint Doctrine.
The Joint Lessons Learned process directly considers the 
operational environment. The operational environment is 
influenced by numerous variables that continuously evolve 
over time. Partnerships and threats change, forces aggregate 
and disaggregate accordingly, and this evolution recurs in 
a typically unpredictable manner. This requires that any analy-
sis of joint operations account for the uncertain nature of the 
environment and associated relationships as well as the episodic 
employment of the constituent systems. The Joint Lessons 
Learned process (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015a) works to examine 
the full breadth of joint operations to assess the strengths and 
weakness of both the overarching Joint Concepts and associated 
Joint Doctrine.
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Note that the Joint Force Development lifecycle is inherently 
a knowledge-based approach to providing joint warfighting cap-
ability. It is a continuous, systematic effort that realizes enter-
prise-level capability through the preparedness of the 
participating organizations. Notably, Joint Force Development 
relies on the utilization of systems to support operations. The 
primary challenge addressed by this paper is related to the 
integration of the processes used to support system development 
and the processes used to support joint operations. Specifically, 
given the episodic nature of joint operations the process that 
supports those operations is not directly tied to the processes 
that support acquisition and development of the systems used in 
joint operations. In the case of the DoD, both the JCIDS and 
DAS processes support development and acquisition.
System Acquisition and Development: JCIDS and DAS
The DoD manages and develops capabilities through JCIDS 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b). The JCIDS process is the 
starting point for all engineering and acquisition efforts 
associated with defense programs. In the context of joint 
Exhibit 1. Organizing Operational Mission Capability 
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force development and operation, the primary outputs of 
interest from the JCIDS process are the capability portfolios 
and capability requirement documents that support the Joint 
Force. Joint Force Development is loosely tied to the JCIDS 
process through Lessons Learned, which serve as a source for 
requirements and gap identification for various processes 
within JCIDS, most notably the execution of Capability Gap 
Assessments (CGAs). The capabilities described in those 
CGAs are typically organized in lattices (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2015b) where Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs) provide 
traceability from planning and operations to global threats, 
allocated to existing or required capability solutions (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014). Those capabilities are a fundamental 
input to the second system of interest, the DAS.
The DAS provides the DOD with an acquisition manage-
ment framework, a requirement management process, and 
integrated architectures to field solution-based capabilities 
(Department of Defense, 2003). Exhibit 3 presents an overview 
of the requirements and acquisition processes.
Within the DAS, the linkage of the requirements and acquisi-
tion processes is intended to achieve the balance between require-
ments, capability, and resources. Requirements definition and 
technology maturation are considered throughout the process to 
promote a disciplined approach toward affordable systems and 
production. Three key documents, the Initial Capabilities Docu-
ment (ICD), the Capability Development Document (CDD), and 
the Capability Production Document (CPD) are produced based on 
the JCIDS process and facilitate integration between system acquisi-
tion and system requirements development. This idea has been 
expanded by recent work in the DoD realm, notably (Dahmann, 
2019) (Gold, 2016) (Hernandez et al., 2018), and (Beery & Paulo, 
2019), which propose expanding traditional engineering approaches 
to specifically consider DoD missions during the early stages of 
system acquisition and engineering. Notably, both the foundational 
DoD guidance and recent mission-focused literature emphasizes the 
utility of DoDAF products. These DoDAF products define the 
system that will be acquired and developed and accordingly drive 
the development of plans that will guide capability assessments, 
system development, and investment decisions (Department of 
Defense, 2009). DoDAF views span eight broad perspectives: Cap-
ability, Operational, Services, Systems, Project, Data and Informa-
tion, Standards, and All (which provide system context) Viewpoints. 
Utilization of these standardized system representations facilitates 
information sharing and communication between the requirements 
community and the acquisition/technical communities.
As mentioned, while engineering and management of the 
associated systems is intended to support operations, this pro-
cess and the associated products are not directly linked to 
Exhibit 2. Joint Force Development Life Cycle (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013).
Exhibit 3. Requirements and Acquisition Processes (From Department of Defense, 2003) 
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operations. Exhibit 4 presents a characterization of the funda-
mental challenge identified by the authors. Namely, the joint 
force development process and the engineering processes are 
integrated and extended over a multi-year timeframe, while 
joint operations exist as an activity that relies on both processes 
but lacks direct temporal or process linkage.
Review of the three primary systems the DoD utilizes for 
developing joint capability (JFD, JCIDS, and DAS) provides 
additional insight into this fundamental issue. The JFD Life-
cycle is not holistically included in the management of materiel 
systems. Joint context, which defines the environment in which 
DoD systems are expected to be utilized, should influence 
system design and operations. However, it is not sufficiently 
included in system engineering or engineering management 
activities as a result of the separation of these systems. While 
JCIDS and DAS can be directly tied to delivery of material 
systems, they are disconnected from the episodic operations 
that those systems are intended to support. Succinctly, engi-
neering management is faced with a structural challenge 
because the capability and system development processes 
(JCIDS and DAS) are not contributing holistically to the field-
ing of operational capability defined and assessed using the JFD 
Lifecycle. In more general terms, this means that engineers and 
engineering managers are producing systems that may not be 
appropriate to satisfy the needs or expected utilization of the 
end users.
Linking Episodic Operations to System Acquisition/ 
Development
Organization of DoD Operational Mission Capability
While a linkage between system acquisition and operational 
capability is conceptually straightforward, the complexity of 
the associated systems makes such a linkage multi-layered and 
complicated. To effectively engage systems engineers and engi-
neering management professionals at the operational level of 
the DoD, and subsequently apply systems engineering and 
engineering management methodologies to develop episodic 
operational capability, the authors believe that it is imperative 
that the operational community and the engineering/manage-
ment community develop a consistent, common approach to 
solution generation and assessment. Warfare at the operational 
level is too complex to simply review and assess high-level 
guidance (joint concepts, joint doctrine, joint lessons learned) 
and subsequently provide thoughts or solutions. There are 
over 80 joint doctrine publications, many with multiple revi-
sions, that provide the necessary operational contexts. Further, 
the relationships and interdependencies between each concept 
must be accounted for when attempting to apply 
a comprehensive engineering management approach to realiz-
ing operational capability. To facilitate meaningful engage-
ment between operators, subject matter experts, and 
engineering managers the authoritative guidance utilized by 
the DoD for joint operations requires organization and 
framing.
Again, the elements of joint operational capability and 
their purpose are organized in Exhibit 1. These are the primary 
contributors to, and enablers of, episodic operational level cap-
ability. The elements are consistent with the doctrinal language 
in the authoritative documents, with a few exceptions, as noted 
in Irwin (2018).
The Operational Elements and associated Purpose state-
ments represent the high-level requirements to produce episo-
dic operational capability presented in the language and 
terminology of the joint community. Because these elements 
and purpose statements are drawn directly from Joint Doctrine, 
they can serve as a starting point for systems engineers and 
engineering management professionals to engage with the joint 
operational community and the warfighter. Specifically, Exhi-
bit 1 distils the operational perspective on joint capability into 
10 primary Operational Elements, which can serve as a starting 
point for a more directed engineering management effort.
Framework Design
This section outlines and explains a proposed Operational 
Architecture Framework (OMAF). The OMAF is envisioned 
as a bridge that links and integrate operations with engineering 
management. Each of the Operational Elements presented in 
Exhibit 1 are included in the OMAF, which is presented as 
Exhibit 5.
Recall that achieving Unified Action is the primary focus of 
Joint Operations. Accordingly, this element of the framework is 
placed at the top. Given that the commander plays a central role 
in unifying the joint force, this placement is consistent with both 
the hierarchical command culture of the DoD enterprise and the 
doctrinal role of the joint force commander. Per Exhibit 1, Uni-
fied Action is achieved when the joint force has successful 
established Lines of Communication, Command Relationships, 
Command Authorities, and Inter-Organizational Coordination.
Achieving Unified Action for the joint force necessarily relies 
on the experience of the command element, which is enacted by 
application of the joint force Operational Core. Exhibit 1 provided 
a summary of the doctrinal strategies to enable this cognitive 
approach by both commander and staff, which is focused on 
integrating ends, ways, and means through the organization of 
the operational area, headquarters, and forces. Additionally, this 
Operational Core specifies the design on operations, planning and 
execution of operational actions, and assessment of the 
Exhibit 4. Temporal and Process Disconnect Between Operational 
Capability and Engineered Systems
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effectiveness of the joint force. The second row of Exhibit 5 pre-
sents an overview of the second segment of the OMAF, the 
Operational Core.
As a joint force commander translate the high-level ele-
ments of Unified Action to the more specific elements of the 
Operational Core, the commander necessarily considers the 
character and composition of the Operational Environment. 
The Operational Environment has a direct impact on the plan-
ning, execution, organization, and design decisions that impact 
the joint force. Note that the Operational Environment (shown 
in the third row of Exhibit 5) spans intuitive external drivers, 
such as the operational area as well as less formulated domains 
such as the Information Environment, the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum, and Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastruc-
ture, and Information drivers.
Given that the OMAF relies on an initial definition of 
the elements of Unified Action, enabled by the Operational 
Core in the context of the Operational Environment, the 
system of interest (in this case the joint force) can now be 
defined in terms of the functions that it is expected to per-
form. Those functions are groups of related capabilities and 
activities that provide integration, synchronization, and 
direction to support the commander of the joint force. 
Notably, these functions do not specify specific systems of 
interest that will realize the associated capabilities or activ-
ities, rather they are characterizations of the functionality 
that is required in a specific episodic operation to realize 
Unified Action. The fourth row of Exhibit 5 presents the full 
span of functions described in Joint Doctrine that may be 
called upon in a joint operation.
Now that the OMAF has established traceability from the 
Unified Action elements of a joint operation to more concrete 
functionality, the requisite systems (or SoS) defined and realized 
through JCIDS/DAS that are necessary to employ the joint force 
can be identified. Typically, system and SoS capabilities devel-
oped within JCIDS/DAS are architected, designed, developed, 
and tested at the tactical level and the corresponding DoDAF 
descriptions represent this level of operation. The OMAF offers 
an alternative perspective, organizing these SoS as direct enablers 
of joint functions (with the acknowledgment that cross-function 
integration such as utilization of information to support fires is 
vitality important). The bottom portion of Exhibit 5 presents the 
lowest level of the OMAF, where the systems and SoS developed 
and described in JCIDS/DAS are contextualized as part of joint 
operations.
The center of the OMAF accordingly provides traceability 
from the elements of Unified Action directly to the constituent 
systems and SoS utilized in joint operations. To facilitate the 
integration of the OMAF with existing joint force development 
processes, the OMAF decouples those processes from the cen-
tral organizing construct of the framework. Recall that joint 
missions are planned and executed in compliance with author-
itative joint concepts and joint doctrine and improved through 
lessons learned. Those processes may address or examine any 
level of the OMAF construct, from Unified Action to SoS. The 
OMAF places these Operational Context elements on the left 
side of the framework shown in Exhibit 5 to communicate this 
all-inclusive aspect.
Finally, recall that the DoD enterprise, through JFD, pre-
pares for and executes a variety of joint missions when called 
upon, both combat and non-combat, in compliance with 
authoritative guidance. The unpredictability of the mission 
of interest is of paramount importance and necessitates that 
the joint force provide operational capability episodically. The 
breadth of relevant missions is therefore positioned on the 
right side of the framework in Exhibit 5, spanning the doc-
trinal elements of the joint enterprise and constituting the 
final element of the OMAF.
Exhibit 5. Operational Mission Architecture Framework (OMAF) 
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Impact of Framework
Historically, the DoD enterprise’s knowledge-based 
approach to joint operations has been summarized in 
authoritative documents, publications, and reports. The 
OMAF presents an organizing construct that provides 
direct traceability from the content of those documents 
and reports to the systems of interest that are utilized to 
support operations. The OMAF distils the wide range of 
operational knowledge to a framework of 10 primary opera-
tional elements that are normalized to joint warfighting 
language and arranged in an intuitive framework. Notably, 
that framework is arranged in such a way that it may serve 
as a mechanism to directly incorporate joint lessons learned 
into the system development and engineering management 
processes. This provides an opportunity for the operational 
community to directly influence system design and engi-
neering management as well as provides an opportunity for 
the design community to be directly responsive to joint 
operations.
Implementing the Framework
The OMAF promotes a consistent dialogue with the operational 
community and the warfighter by establishing a common start-
ing point for engineering and management efforts specifically 
tailored to support episodic operational capability. Notably, 
using the OMAF, enterprise architecture tools (specifically, 
DoDAF) can be leveraged to generate system descriptions neces-
sary to guide solution design using operational terminology. To 
demonstrate the intended application of the framework, several 
recent studies of joint operations are examined and the lessons 
learned identified in those studies are translated from report- 
based text to the organizing framework defined in the OMAF.
Framework Application
Within the JFD Lifecycle, operational assessments are con-
ducted to institutionalize lessons learned from past events. To 
demonstrate the applicability of the OMAF four operational 
assessments spanning different mission types, locations, and 
operational environments are assessed. The assessments are 
decomposed and issues from each are associated with OMAF 
elements, which allows for the generation of architectural 
representations of potential solutions that are previously only 
captured as narrative text.
Each study was originally conducted by the Joint and 
Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) element of the Joint 
Staff. One report is selected in each of the following areas: 
foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), disaster relief (DR), 
noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), and combat opera-
tions (CO). Each area presents a potentially different challenge 
and, as a result, different lessons learned. The reports selected 
for application to the OMAF are Operation Unified Assistance 
(Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis [JCOA], 2015), 
Operation Unified Response (JCOA, 2010), Operation Odyssey 
Dawn (JCOA, 2011), and the Decade of War (JCOA, 2012). 
Exhibit 6 presents a visual representation of the issues that are 
raised in each study as an area of concern and translates each 
issue from narrative text within a JCOA report to an element of 
the OMAF.
Note that several issues are repeated, suggesting that they 
may be systemic at the operational level. At the highest level, 
lines of communication, command relationships, and coordina-
tion issues created problems across almost all operations. At the 
core of the framework, organizing and planning joint opera-
tions caused repeated issues. At the lowest level, intelligence 
and information integration are problematic, independent of 
the mission. To demonstrate the applicability of the OMAF, 
Exhibit 6. JCOA Studies Mission Issue Map
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noting that the tool is intended to provide actionable recom-
mendations to correct unexpected issues, Operation Unified 
Response is assessed in detail.
Operation Unified Response was conducted in response to 
the 2010 magnitude 7.0 earthquake that resulted in a disaster 
response operation in Haiti. Review of JCOA, 2010 emphasizes 
that command and control challenges impacted understanding 
of the operational environment as well as the ability to perform 
regular progress assessments. This impacted movement, logistics, 
and organization of the task force. As a result, Exhibit 6 high-
lights command and control (C2) as a function that negatively 
impacted operational performance in Operation Unified 
Response. Notably, C2 failures were not identified by the JCOA 
as problematic in other operations. Per the organizing construct 
presented by the OMAF, these operational issues are translated 
into DoDAF operational views that structure identification of 
potential issues. These operational views can be used to imple-
ment C2 as a warfighting function, as defined in (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2017), to identify potential areas for improvement in sub-
sequent operations. Exhibit 7 presents the C2 function as 
a DoDAF Operational View 5b (Operational Activity Model).
In Exhibit 7 the problematic C2 function is decomposed 
into a sequence of three distinct parallel processes per the issues 
identified in (JCOA, 2010). Note that Exhibit 7 condenses the 
narrative explanation of the C2 issues in Operation Unified 
Response into a standardized architecture representation. The 
first C2 process described in (JCOA, 2010) is shown as 
a coordination and planning processes that, when complete, 
produces a definitive mission prioritization. The second process 
translates that mission prioritization, through risk assessment 
and resource allocation, into a set of operational areas. Finally, 
those operational areas are used as the foundation for capability 
definition and coordination and are assessed to inform the 
completeness of the C2 function. Orientation of this opera-
tional terminology into the standardized representation of 
a DoDAF OV-5b allows for an assessment of the C2 function 
execution, as well as directed investment to influence either the 
individuals or systems allocated to the performance of each 
operational activity that defines the C2 function.
While this does not serve as a comprehensive demonstra-
tion of the utility of the OMAF approach, it demonstrates that 
the approach can provide an architectural orientation that 
supports the application of enterprise architecture tools. Devel-
opment of DoDAF products per the organization defined in the 
OMAF ensures that they are developed in compliance with 
existing engineering and management standards and are speci-
fically tailored to engage with warfighters in operational terms. 
This blended approach fosters collaborative development 
between the engineering management community and the 
operational community to expedite solution development.
Summary and Conclusions
Currently, the DoD relies on human beings to apply human- 
centered processes to subjectively identify the systems and inte-
gration requirements necessary to deliver an operational capabil-
ity (in a manner that cannot be repeated episodically). 
Application of the OMAF creates an opportunity to utilize formal 
engineering and management methods specifically designed to 
objectively identify the system and integration requirements 
necessary to deliver an operational capability (in a manner that 
can be repeated episodically). The OMAF accepts the output of 
existing operational capability process (such as the Joint Force 
Development Life Cycle) and existing enterprise systems engi-
neering management processes (JCIDS, DAS, etc.) and integrates 
them to facilitate direct communication between the end user 
(operations) and the engineers and engineering managers.
Two elements of the approach are vitally important. First, no 
change is required to the Joint Force Development processes, 
particularly the lessons learned process. Joint lessons learned 
can be produced in compliance with the joint force development 
life cycle. However, to better engage the engineering management 
community, if those lessons learned are characterized in terms of 
Exhibit 7. OMAF Defined C2 Function (As DoDAF Operational View 5b)
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operations, policy, materiel, and doctrine in a way that is con-
sistent with the OMAF there is an ensured compatibility and 
consistency with the architectural products typically produced 
in the JCIDS and DAS processes. Second, because the OMAF 
serves as a mechanism to directly incorporate lessons learned into 
the system development process both processes can be more 
responsive to the needs of different communities without the 
need to adapt or modify terminology. The joint operational 
community has the opportunity to communicate, in joint opera-
tional terminology, needs directly to the engineering and man-
agement community. Similarly, the engineering and management 
community can communicate, via standardized DoDAF termi-
nology, the system-level changes and decisions that can support 
the joint operational community.
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